O Suicídio da Europa

É evidente que a Europa, como era, não tanto com os seus males, tão terríveis quanto os dos outros continentes, mas com os seus bens, de humanismo e alta cultura, está perdida. 

A Europa pode ter muitos defeitos mas foi ela que produziu os maiores génios e sábios das ciências, da filosofia e das artes. E de tal maneira que aos outros só lhes resta fazer versões mais ou menos bem conseguidas. Cruéis, opressores e imperialistas? Também, mas é preciso lembrar que as civilizações pré-colombianas (Incas, Aztecas, etc.), os impérios africanos pré-coloniais, os árabes, os mongóis, os japoneses e outros, não lhes ficaram nada atrás nessas práticas. Recuso-me, por exemplo, a condenar a civilização da Grécia Antiga invocando o esclavagismo. Para além destas e de outras formas de relação social, que é preciso contextualizar, compreender e explicar historicamente, ficaram, espero que para sempre, como fruto da História da Europa, as maiores criações humanas. O negacionismo europeu de extrema-direita equipara-se ao negacionismo oportunista e vingativo do resto do mundo. 

O humanismo transformou-se em direito-humanismo instrumental, a alta cultura, e a própria cultura popular, europeias, tanto por efeito de calculismo ideológico quanto por efeito de uma política cultural que cedeu ao comércio, são inteiramente desconhecidas dos jovens e de muitos menos jovens. O sentimento de culpa, que os mongóis não têm, que os descendentes dos escravistas e genocidas africanos não têm, têm de sobra os europeus. 

E o que é mais trágico é a ignorância dos europeus comuns face à manipulação deste sentimento de culpa pelas elites económicas, financeiras e intelectuais europeias e americanas pró-globalistas, as quais põem à frente de tudo, em especial dos Estados-Nação, empecilhos, como sagrada, a liberdade económica. Tudo o que não luta por si merece morrer.

Srebrenica – the Memoirs of a Portuguese General – II

 Peacekeeper (II)

See Part I
In his memoir, «War in the Balkans», (1) retired Portuguese general Carlos Martins Branco, who was during the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia in the strategically important post of Deputy Head of Mission of UN Military Observers in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-1996), recounts his knowledge of events that took place around Srebrenica in July of 1995.
In contrast to the fanciful tales of a bevy of dubious «experts», false witnesses, and outright propagandists, General Martins Branco reports facts as they were observed or collected by intelligence and other sources in the field. That information made its way through official channels to his desk in Zagreb, where the headquarters of the UN Observer Mission was located. Martins Branco’s facts and conclusions are hardly susceptible to off-hand dismissal. Excerpts cited below are on pages 201 – 206 of his memoir.
We will begin with the general’s conclusion challenging the received wisdom that Srebrenica was genocide and then work our way back from there:
«Had they entertained the specific intent to commit genocide, the Serbs would have blocked the enclave from all sides so that nobody could have managed to escape. Instead, they attacked from two directions, southeast and east, where they concentrated their assault forces, leaving open corridors for withdrawal toward the north and west (…) nor would they have planned the transportation of seventeen thousand women, children, and elderly, as occurred on July 12 and 13, which made it possible for about half the displaced persons to reach Federation territory. A great number of Srebrenica residents, who did manage to flee, found refuge in Serbia where they spent several years without being bothered by anyone. For the assertion of genocide to hold, it was necessary to conceal some inconvenient facts which were liable to compromise it».
Martins Branco does not deny that «the attack on Srebrenica resulted in many deaths». He notes, however, that «even after twenty years no one has managed to determine their number». (Actually, the Hague Tribunal has been attempting to make that determination but as a result of its lackadaisical efforts we now have, in various verdicts, five drastically varying figures the highest and the lowest separated by a gap of 4.000, all presumably reflecting the judicially ascertained number of executed victims.)
As «Srebrenica Historical Project» has been arguing for years, Martins Branco points out also a very important fact, namely the heterogeneity of the causes of death among the exhumed Srebrenica-related human remains. The author describes the forensic situation in the following terms:
«The causes of the deaths which occurred during and after military operations were various: combat between the two armies facing each other; combat between the Serbian forces and militants taking flight, who were joined by civilians; internecine warfare among fighters of the Bosnian army; and lastly executions of war prisoners».
As for the antecedents of the «magic figure of 8.000 missing (that was an initial Red Cross estimate) which ultimately morphed into an unchallengeable truth», the author says that at a certain point it became a «fact which it was forbidden to question, even before any proof was forthcoming». And he continues: «Woe unto him who would dare to challenge that incontrovertible truth. He will immediately be excommunicated and labeled a ‘genocide denier.’ The fact that 3.000 persons who had been declared missing found their way onto the voting rolls in the September 1996 elections had no impact whatsoever on the incessant repetition of the narrative about 8.000 dead. The media never expressed the slightest curiosity in the face of this and a number of other obvious incoherencies. It was easier to keep relentlessly repeating the genocide theory, which the mass media eagerly promoted. But regardless of the stubborn reassertion of that ‘truth’ it is worth recalling that between a media sound bite and a historical fact there continues to be a huge gap».
«How many prisoners were shot, and how many were killed in battle?», General Martins Branco raises one of the key questions. «We are quite far from having the answers, and I would say that we will have a difficult time ever finding them. It is much easier – and simpler – to talk about genocide».

The Portuguese officer nevertheless ventures to make some estimates of the possible number of war crime victims in Srebrenica in July of 1995:
«The execution by Serbian forces in Srebrenica and the environs of a considerable number of Muslim males – well informed sources cite the figure of 2.000 – among whom the majority were soldiers, was undoubtedly a war crime».
The number mentioned by Martins Branco is significant for a number of independent reasons. Firstly, because the same number of execution victims – 2.000 – is cited by another, no less respectable intelligence source, John Schindler, a high-ranking US intelligence officer who was stationed in Sarajevo contemporaneously with the Srebrenica events. Schindler’s assessment, made from his Sarajevo vantage point, is completely congruent with Martins Branco’s coming out of Zagreb. It was articulated in Ole Flyum’s documentary «Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed». (2) Both assessments match available forensic data to a T. And it should be borne in mind that when things happen to be rather muddled, as they are with Srebrenica, a synthesis of intelligence data deriving from various trustworthy sources should always be paid close attention. It often presents an overall picture that is far more reliable than the reports of isolated individuals, whose field of vision is often limited and who frequently are not even objective.
Finally, the figure jointly suggested by Martins Branco and Schindler, which the available material evidence fully supports, is of interest also for an additional reason. Within the various intelligence communities a rumor has persistently been making rounds alleging the existence of a document – a mysterious letter sent by Alija Izetbegovic to Naser Oric in the Spring of 1995, not long before the commencement of the Srebrenica operation – where it is supposedly reaffirmed that the offer of foreign intervention still stood, as well as the condition that the Bosnian Serb takeover of Srebrenica ought to be accompanied by mass slaughter. The key point in that alleged letter is that the number of victims that would satisfy the interventionist criterion of the interested foreign party would be the already familiar figure of – 2.000.
«However», our author continues, «that was not an act of genocide, as is asserted in many places, mainly by the Tribunal at The Hague, in the form of a political argument». As a civilized person he, of course, entirely agrees that «taking justice into one’s own hands, which is culturally characteristic not just of Serbs but of other communities of the Former Yugoslavia as well, does not justify or mitigate the gravity of the committed act. That was, beyond doubt, a violation of the Geneva Convention».
His main point, nevertheless, would seem to be that things definitively ought to be called by their proper name:
«Terrible war crimes must be punished. Yet these criminal acts cannot and should not be confused with genocide. When war crimes, such as the execution of hundreds of military age males, are conflated with genocide, where it is necessary to establish the intent to systematically eradicate members of an ethnic community, that sends a very frivolous signal. That is particularly evident if we bear in mind the fact that the party committing the crime had made available the means to transport seventeen thousand displaced persons, which is about fifty percent of the entire displaced population».
Martins Branco then turns his attention to another notable «incoherence» in the Srebrenica affair, which is that the «Tribunal has so far condemned but a single direct perpetrator» (in a footnote he clarifies that the reference is to Drazen Erdemovic, a perpetrator defendant-turned-prosecution-witness who was initially rewarded with a laughably insignificant three year sentence for signing a plea bargain agreement, followed by numerous benefits in return for his mechanically repeated and highly disputed testimony).  (3) The Portuguese author stresses that «no one else was ever put in the dock for executing prisoners of war but, rather, based on ‘command responsibility’ or participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise, which is the Tribunal’s favored doctrine but the application of which in such a conflict situation is highly dubious. How is it possible to claim genocide if, after twenty years, the Tribunal is incapable of determining the number of victims, the cause of death, and who killed them?»
All eminently logical questions. Martins Branco should perhaps also be given credit for this equally astute observation:
«The Tribunal has forgotten to concern itself with crimes committed around Srebrenica between 1992 and 1995 where the victims were Serbs, resulting in the murder of almost two thousand persons (males, females, children, and elderly), in some cases after acts of torture and other atrocities. For the most part this has been carefully documented, and the identity of the perpetrators is known (…) As Richard Holbrooke admitted in his book, ‘the Tribunal had always been a valuable political instrument of US policy». (4) Quite so, indeed.
And when talking about genocide, Martins Branco is not shy to draw a sharp contrast between the situation in Srebrenica in July of 1995 and what transpired in relatively close proximity barely a month later, in August, as Croatian armed forces went into attack mode:
«What happened in Srebrenica cannot and should not be equated to what happened a month later in the Krajina, where the Croatian army conducted an operation of systematic murder of the Serbian population which did not manage to find any shelter, sparing no one. Men, women, children, the elderly – all without distinction were subjected to the same atrocities, and things even worse. That operation was planned down to the last detail and was amply documented. The orders were issued by Tudjman to his generals, at a meeting in Brioni on July 31, 1995, on the eve of Operation Storm. The Tribunal never considered the events in Krajina as a possible genocide. Western media kept a careful distance from those events. Their silence was complicit and deafening».
Concluding his reminiscences, Martins Branco seems to harbor no doubt that Srebrenica was the perfidious fruit of long-term planning and parallel activity of various interested parties. In support of that, he cites evidence from Ibran Mustafic’s book «Planned Chaos», statements of local politician Zlatko Dukic, and revelations by Srebrenica enclave police chief during the conflict, Hakija Meholjic. The author singles out  in particular the intriguing claim of the then chief of staff of the Bosnian army, Sefer Halilovic, that in fact Izetbegovic had made the decision to «discard» Srebrenica rather early in the game but was determined «to extract from it maximum political profit».
Incidentally, while considering what Meholjic and Halilovic had to say on the subject and the evidence that the event may have been conceived some time in advance, it is worth recalling Meholjic’s famous claim of Izetbegovic’s offer to allow the slaughter of Srebrenica’s residents in return for foreign intervention, Srebrenica later to be traded with the Serbs for the Sarajevo suburb of Vogosca. The episode, be it recalled, is alleged to have taken place in the Fall of 1993, when a Bosniak National Congress was being convened in Sarajevo. However, in his book «The Cunning Strategy» (5) Sefer Halilovic set forth some additional information on the subject that may be of possible significance. He claims that the idea of staging a Srebrenica massacre, in return for harvesting its political dividends, was most likely entertained in the minds of Alija Izetbegovic and the Bosnian leadership even before the Congress. It so happens that at the time of the book’s publication Halilovic was politically on the outs with Izetbegovic so perhaps his assertions should for that reason be taken with a grain of salt. The fact remains, however, for all it is worth, that according to Halilovic (who is alive and may be questioned concerning his statements) Izetbegovic had mentioned to him in the Spring of 1993 the supposed offer which several months later, towards the end of the year, was to shock Meholjic and the other members of the Srebrenica delegation in attendance at the Bosniak meeting.
General Carlos Martins Branco’s reflections about Srebrenica are a valuable piece of the mosaic, supplementing and improving our understanding of events. His book is not simply the notes of a strategically positioned foreign observer, but much more than that. It is, in a certain sense, a coming to terms with the politically obscured reality of the matter by institutions which the author – willingly and consciously, or not – nevertheless personifies. In considerable measure, it furnishes answers to such important questions as «what did they know and when did they find out». The clear subtext of Martins Branco’s memoir is that the author and the instances above and below him had the capability of following events in real time, that they pretty much knew who was doing what and to whom, and that on a deeper analytical level they have no illusions – not to speak of dilemmas – about the real nature and background of Srebrenica. After reading «War in the Balkans – Jihadism, Geopolitics, and Disinformation», it is difficult to imagine that the proverbial «powers that be» were in the dark about the cynical political agenda which Srebrenica has come to serve.
(1) A Guerra nos Balcãs, jihadismo, geopolítica e desinformação [War in the Balkans, Jihadism, Geopolitics, and Disinformation]  Edições Colibri 2016.
(2) «Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed», 50:50 to 51:10 minutes
(3) Erdemovic’s account was meticulously picked apart by Bulgarian journalist Zerminal Civikov in «Srebrenica. Der Kronzeuge», Edition Brennpunkt, Osteuropa, 2009.
(4) Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War, p. 190.
(5) Halilovic, Sefer: «The Cunning Strategy» (Lukava strategija), Sarajevo 1997, pp. 130-132.

Srebrenica – the Memoirs of a Portuguese General I

General Carlos Martins Branco is one of the most fascinating (and until quite recently also inaccessible) actors in the Srebrenica controversy. From his Zagreb vantage point as deputy head of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) between 1994 and 1996, during the latter phase of the 1990s Yugoslav conflict as it unfolded in Croatia and Bosnian and Herzegovina, this Portuguese officer had privileged access to significant information. Confidential reports about the goings on in the field were crossing his desk. With first-hand information and further enlightened by discrete conversations with colleagues from various intelligence structures, Martins Branco was positioned ideally to learn facts which many officials would have preferred to cover up, and the media frequently ignored.
With a typically Latin emotional flair, refusing to remain silent as the «Srebrenica genocide narrative» was taking shape in the second half of the 1990s, Martins Branco published in 1998 an article provocatively entitled «Was Srebrenica a Hoax? Eyewitness Account of a Former UN Military Observer in Bosnia» In that early plunge into the toxic Srebrenica debate, Martins Branco ventured a number of critical questions concerning the notorious events in July 1995:
«One may agree or disagree with my political analysis, but one really ought to read the account of how Srebrenica fell, who are the victims whose bodies have been found so far, and why the author believes that the Serbs wanted to conquer Srebrenica and make the Bosnian Muslims flee, rather than having any intentions of butchering them. The comparison Srebrenica vs. Krajina, as well as the related media reaction by the ‘free press’ in the West, is also rather instructive».
Shortly after that expression of skepticism about the nature of the disputed events in Srebrenica, Martins Branco practically disappeared from view. Not physically, of course. He spent several years in Florence teaching at the European University Institute and preparing his doctoral dissertation. After that, in 2007 and 2008 he was attached by his government to NATO forces in Afghanistan in the capacity of media spokesperson for the Commander. From 2008 until recently, when he retired, General Martins Branco served as deputy director of the National Defense Institute of the Portuguese armed forces.
This impressive background, to which we may add the duty of head of the Intelligence Affairs Section of EUROFOR for Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo from 1996 to 1999, bespeaks an elite and highly trained staff officer, with first-class intelligence capabilities and powers of observation.
Intrigued by Martins Branco’s out-of-the-box analysis of Srebrenica events, shortly after the founding of our NGO «Srebrenica Historical Project» we attempted to establish communication with him to see if he would share with us some of his exceptional information and insights. Our efforts were fruitless and correspondence with the general over the years came down mostly to an exchange of non-committal courtesies. Defense teams at the ICTY in the Hague, which endeavored to obtain him as a witness on their clients’ behalf, had no better luck. However, not very long ago General Martins Branco wrote to us seeking answers to some questions concerning Srebrenica. He mentioned that in November 2016 his memoirs were published in Portugal. That volume, which he kindly made available to us, encompassed the period of his service in the Balkans. It was entitled «A Guerra nos Balcãs, jihadismo, geopolítica e desinformação» [War in the Balkans, Jihadism, Geopolitics, and Disinformation], published by Edições Colibri in Lisbon.
As already seen numerous times with high-level officials, in this case as well open expression of intimate views and public disclosure of facts regarded of a delicate nature had to wait for retirement. In General Martins  Branco’s case, the wait was worthwhile. These fascinating recollections from the Balkan war theater consist of the insights of a Portuguese officer attached to UN forces into such episodes as the merciless expulsion, accompanied by mass killing, of the Serbian population of Krajina by Croatian forces. These outrages were orchestrated with the discrete backing of the NATO alliance, for which the author indirectly happened to be working at the time. Events surrounding Srebrenica in July 0f 1995 encompass another portion of his recollections. For the moment, we will focus on the latter and Martins Branco’s perception of the background and impact of the Srebrenica situation.
Already in his introduction to the chapters of his memoirs that deal with Srebrenica, Martins Branco questions the coherence of the prevalent view that it constituted genocide:
«General Ratko Mladic had made it known that he was leaving open a corridor for withdrawal toward Tuzla. With Mladic’s approval, about 6.000 persons took advantage of that opportunity. In a report by the Dutch Foreign Ministry it is noted that, according to UN sources, by August 4 a total of 35.632 displaced persons had made it to Tuzla, of whom between 800 and 1.000 were members of Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces. Out of that total, 17.500 had been evacuated by bus». (Page 195)
The Portuguese general then continues:
«Srebrenica was portrayed – and continues to be – as a premeditated massacre of innocent Muslim civilians. As a genocide! But was it really so? A more careful and informed assessment of those events leads me to doubt it». (Page 196)
Martins Branco goes on to raise some pointed questions, and he does so purely in the capacity of a professional soldier:
«There are various estimates of the relative strength of forces involved in the Srebrenica battle. On the Serbian side, at most 3.000 fighters could have taken part. The number of armored vehicles is more difficult to determine, as stated at the beginning of this chapter. According to field reports, however, not more than six such vehicles were in motion at any given time. Though we lack reliable information about troop strength on the Muslim side, it is entirely probable that they numbered a minimum of 4.000 armed men, counting together Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina soldiers and members of the paramilitaries. According to some sources, they numbered up to 6.000. But for the purposes of this analysis, we will consider the 4.000 figure as credible». (Page 196)
The general then goes on:
«The topographical features of the terrain around Srebrenica, and Eastern Bosnia as a whole, are extremely rugged and hilly.  Crags, thickly forested areas, and deep ravines impede the movement of military vehicles while facilitating infantry operations. In relation to ground features, which beyond any doubt favor defenders, the numerical relationship of forces on the opposing sides suggests that Bosnian army troops had at their disposal more than sufficient manpower to put up a defense. They, however, failed to do that. Taking into account the numerical ratio of attackers to defenders, as we were taught at the military academy, for the attack to have any chance of success the number of attackers would have to exceed that of the defenders by a factor of at least three. In the case at hand, that ratio was more than advantageous to the defenders (4.000 defenders versus 3.000 attackers). In addition, the defenders had the additional benefit of knowing the landscape». (Page 196)
Martins Branco than asks one of the key Srebrenica questions:
«Given that military advantage favored the defense, why did the Bosnian army fail to put up any resistance to Serbian forces? Why did the command of the 28th Division of the Bosnian army – acting apparently contrary to its interest – fail to establish a defense line, as at other times it knew well how to do, as for instance during the April 1993 crisis? Why did Muslim forces in the enclave fail to act to regain control over their heavy weapons, which had been deposited in a local warehouse under UN’s lock and key? Was it no more than an oversight?» (Page 197)
As a supplement to these well-formulated questions, we may note that already on July 6, as the Serbian attack was commencing, the Dutch battalion command in Srebrenica let it be known to the 28th Division that it was free to retrieve its warehoused heavy armaments, if it so wished. That fact was revealed in the Dutch battalion «Debriefing», which came out in October of 1995. However, Muslim forces in Srebrenica inexplicably ignored this invitation, thus reinforcing the impression that – for political or other reasons – they lacked the purpose of militarily resisting the Serbian attack.
Which leads the author to the following reflections:
«Twenty years later, we still lack satisfactory answers to questions that seem crucial, assuming that we are seeking to find out what exactly happened. The passivity and absence of a military reaction on the part of Muslim forces in the enclave is in stark contrast to their offensive behavior during the preceding two years, which was manifested in the form of systematic slaughter of Serbian civilians in the villages surrounding Srebrenica». (Page 197)
The author then discloses an intriguing detail that was previously unknown even to this reviewer:
«Ramiz Becirevic [in command of the 28th Division in Naser Oric’s absence] initially issued an order for the heavy weapons to be collected. However, he cancelled it shortly thereafter, explaining that he had received a countermanding order. Who was the source of that order, and for what reason was it given? For the record, let it be noted that in the morning of July 6, as the Serbian attack was starting, acting on his own responsibility, the Dutchbat commander informed the leadership of the Bosnian army that the Serbs had ‘trespassed’ the enclave’s boundaries and that the UN would not be object should they come to retrieve their heavy weaponry that had been deposited in a local warehouse». (Page 197)
 Pressing further his point about the enigmatic dissipation within the Srebrenica enclave of the will to resist, Martins Branco points out that Naser Oric, «the charismaticleader who very likely would have acted differently», was withdrawn from the enclave in April of 1995, never to return. He therefore goes on to ask some common sense questions:
«Was [Oric’s] return prevented by the Second Corps of the Bosnian army, of which 28th Division was part? What could have been the reasons for that? We still lack convincing answers to these questions». (Page 198)
«On the other hand», the Portuguese author continues with his detailed analysis of the suspicious train of events, «officials of the local SDA, the Party of Democratic Action that was in charge in Sarajevo, not only refused, citing strange reasons, to assist UN forces in evacuating Srebrenica, which is to say their own population and refugees from the surrounding villages who had taken shelter in the town, but they went even further by preventing them from fleeing in the direction of Potocari. Instead, they submitted to the commander of B Company [of the Dutchbat] a long list of demands, the fullment of which was insisted upon as the condition for their cooperation. The nature of these demands suggested the existence of a carefully elaborated advance plan which, however, did not mesh with the conditions that actually prevailed on the ground at that particular moment. At that point, there were only two issues which were of significance to the municipal president: one, the demand to the Military Observers on July 10 to disseminate to the outside world a report alleging the use of chemical weapons by Serbian forces, although that was not true; secondly, to publicly accuse the international media of spreading misinformation that Muslim forces were offering armed resistance, with an additional demand to the UN to also issue an official denial to that effect. According to him, Bosnian soldiers neither used heavy weapons, nor were they prepared to ever do so. At the same time, he complained about the lack of foodstuffs and the dismal humanitarian situation. The outline of an official narrative was becoming perceptible and it consisted of two messages: the absence of any military resistance and lack of food». (Page 198)
To put it in plain English, this elite NATO officer with excellent powers of observation and acumen for critical analysis «smelled a rat,» and he did so right from the beginning of the game. He does not say it outright in his memoirs, but it is strongly suggested that these doubts about the authenticity of the official Srebrenica narrative were proliferating in his mind in real time, as field reports accumulated on his desk in Zagreb.
Martins Branco then pops the logical question or, rather, he points his finger at one of the key incoherencies of the official account of Srebrenica events:
«A question mark could also be put over the complete absence of a military response of any kind by the Second Corps of the Bosnian army, whose zone of responsibility encompassed northeastern Bosnia, including Tuzla (where its headquarters was located), as well as Doboj, Bijeljina, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Zvornik. Bosnian army intelligence agencies, whose ear was constantly fixed on Serbian signal communications, were perfectly aware of the impending offensive operation. In spite of not at all being in the dark concerning the Serbs’ intention to attack, the Second Corps of the Bosnian army did not make the slightest move to weaken the Serbs’ pressure upon the enclave. It was a known fact that the Drina Corps, the Serbian army unit in whose zone of responsibility Srebrenica was located, was exhausted and that the attack on Srebrenica was made feasible only by scraping together forces withdrawn from other segments of the front, which naturally left in its wake many vulnerable points. Why didn’t the Second Corps undertake an attack along the entire front line with the Drina Corps, not merely in order to relieve the pressure on Srebrenica but also to exploit the Serbian forces’ temporary vulnerabilities in order to seize territory in areas that were left unprotected? Following the passage of twenty years, we still do not have the answer to this more than coherent and reasonable question». (Pages 198-199)
These are just some of the more important reasons leading a professional soldier to be skeptical of the general framework of the accepted Srebrenica narrative. As we will see in the next installment of this review, his more detailed analysis raises even more troubling questions.

The “Holodomor” and the Film “Bitter Harvest” are Fascist Lies

CTnYtsRWEAERS53

http://www.counterpunch.orghttp://www.counterpunch.org

Posted By Grover Furr On March 3, 2017 @ 12:18 am In articles 2015 | Comments Disabled
(Author’s note: In this article I rely heavily on the evidence cited in the research of Mark Tauger of West Virginia University. Tauger has spent his professional life studying Russian and Soviet famines and agriculture. He is a world authority on these subjects, and is cordially disliked by Ukrainian nationalists and anticommunists generally because his research explodes their falsehoods. )

22without-jews-there-would-never-have-been-bolshevism

Judeus: os bodes expiatórios

 

The Ukrainian nationalist film “Bitter Harvest” propagates lies invented by Ukrainian nationalists. In his review Louis Proyect propagates these lies.

Proyect cites Jeff Coplon’s 1988 Village Voice article “In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: A 55-Year-Old Famine Feeds the Right.” In it Coplon shows that the leading “mainstream” anticommunist Western experts on Soviet history rejected any notion of a deliberate famine aimed at Ukrainians. They still reject it. Proyect fails to mention this fact.

There was a very serious famine in the USSR, including (but not limited to) the Ukrainian SSR, in 1932-33. But there has never been any evidence of a “Holodomor” or “deliberate famine,” and there is none today.

The “Holodomor” fiction was invented in by Ukrainian Nazi collaborators who found havens in Western Europe, Canada, and the USA after the war. An early account is Yurij Chumatskij, Why Is One Holocaust Worth More Than Others? published in Australia in 1986 by “Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” this work is an extended attack on “Jews” for being too pro-communist.

Proyect’s review perpetuates the following falsehoods about the Soviet collectivization of agriculture and the famine of 1932-33:

* That in the main the peasants resisted collectivization because it was a “second serfdom.”

* That the famine was caused by forced collectivization. In reality the famine had environmental causes.

* That “Stalin” – the Soviet leadership – deliberately created the famine.

* That it was aimed at destroying Ukrainian nationalism.

* That “Stalin” (the Soviet government) “stopped the policy of “Ukrainization,” the promotion of a policy to encourage Ukrainian language and culture.

None of these claims are true. None are supported by evidence. They are simply asserted by Ukrainian nationalist sources for the purpose of ideological justification of their alliance with the Nazis and participation in the Jewish Holocaust, the genocide of Ukrainian Poles (the Volhynian massacres of 1943-44) and the murder of Jews, communists, and many Ukrainian peasants after the war.

Their ultimate purpose is to equate communism with Nazism (communism is outlawed in today’s “democratic Ukraine”); the USSR with Nazi Germany; and Stalin with Hitler.

Collectivization of Agriculture – The Reality

Russia and Ukraine had suffered serious famines every few years for more than a millennium. A famine accompanied the 1917 revolution, growing more serious in 1918-1920. Another serious famine, misnamed the “Volga famine,” struck from 1920-21. There were famines in 1924 and again in 1928-29, this last especially severe in the Ukrainian SSR. All these famines had environmental causes. The medieval strip-farming method of peasant agriculture made efficient agriculture impossible and famines inevitable.

Soviet leaders, Stalin among them, decided that the only solution was to reorganize agriculture on the basis of large factory-type farms like some in the American Midwest, which were deliberately adopted as models. When sovkhozy or “Soviet farms” appeared to work well the Soviet leadership made the decision to collectivize agriculture.

Contrary to anticommunist propaganda, most peasants accepted collectivization. Resistance was modest; acts of outright rebellion rare. By 1932 Soviet agriculture, including in the Ukrainian SSR, was largely collectivized.

In 1932 Soviet agriculture was hit with a combination of environmental catastrophes: drought in some areas; too much rain in others; attacks of rust and smut (fungal diseases); and infestations of insects and mice. Weeding was neglected as peasants grew weaker, further reducing production.

The reaction of the Soviet government changed as the scope of the crop failure became clearer during the Fall and Winter of 1932. Believing at first that mismanagement and sabotage were leading causes of a poor harvest, the government removed many Party and collective farm leaders (there is no evidence that any were “executed” like Mykola in the film.) In early February 1933 the Soviet government began to provide massive grain aid to famine areas.

The Soviet government also organized raids on peasant farms to confiscate excess grain in order to feed the cities, which did not produce their own food. Also, to curb profiteering; in a famine grain could be resold for inflated prices. Under famine conditions a free market in grain could not be permitted unless the poor were to be left to starve, as had been the practice under the Tsars.

The Soviet government organized political departments (politotdely) to help peasants in agricultural work. Tauger concludes: “The fact that the 1933 harvest was so much larger than those of 1931-1932 means that the politotdely around the country similarly helped farms work better.” (Modernization, 100)

The good harvest of 1933 was brought in by a considerably smaller population, since many had died during the famine, others were sick or weakened, and still others had fled to other regions or to the cities. This reflects the fact that the famine was caused not by collectivization, government interference, or peasant resistance but by environmental causes no longer present in 1933.

Collectivization of agriculture was a true reform, a breakthrough in revolutionizing Soviet agriculture. There were still years of poor harvests — the climate of the USSR did not change. But, thanks to collectivization, there was only one more devastating famine in the USSR, that of 1946-1947. The most recent student of this famine, Stephen Wheatcroft, concludes that this famine was caused by environmental conditions and by the disruptions of the war.

Proyect’s False Claims

Proyect uncritically repeats the self-serving Ukrainian fascist version of history without qualification.

* There was no “Stalinist killing machine.”

* Committed Party officials were not “purged and executed.”

* “Millions of Ukrainians” were not “forced into state farms and collectives.” Tauger concludes that most peasants accepted the collective farms and worked well in them.

* Proyect accepts the Ukrainian nationalist claim of “3-5 million premature deaths.” This is false.

Some Ukrainian nationalists cite figures of 7-10 million, in order to equal or surpass the six million of the Jewish Holocaust (cf. Chumatskij’s title “Why Is One Holocaust Worth More Than Others?”). The term “Holodomor” itself (“holod” = “hunger”, “mor” from Polish “mord” = “murder,” Ukrainian “morduvati” = “to murder) was deliberately coined to sound similar to “Holocaust.”

The latest scholarly study of famine deaths is 2.6 million (Jacques Vallin, France Meslé, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pirozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies 56, 3 (2002): 249–64).

* Jeff Coplon is not a “Canadian trade unionist” but a New-York based journalist and writer, The late Douglas Tottle’s book Fraud, Famine and Fascism, a reasonable response to Robert Conquest’s fraudulent Harvest of Sorrow, was written (as was Conquest’s book) before the flood of primary sources from former Soviet archives released since the end of the USSR in 1991 and so is seriously out of date.

* Walter Duranty’s statement about “omelets” and “eggs” was not said “in defense of Stalin” as Proyect claims but in criticism of Soviet government policy:

But — to put it brutally — you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs, and the Bolshevist leaders are just as indifferent to the casualties that may be involved in their drive toward socialization as any General during the World War who ordered a costly attack in order to show his superiors that he and his division possessed the proper soldierly spirit. In fact, the Bolsheviki are more indifferent because they are animated by fanatical conviction. (The New York Times March 31, 1933)

Evidently Proyect simply copied this canard from some Ukrainian nationalist source. Garbage In, Garbage Out.

* Andrea Graziosi, whom Proyect quotes, is not a scholar of Soviet agriculture or the 1932-33 famine but an ideological anticommunist who assents to any and all anti-Soviet falsehoods. The article Proyect quotes is from Harvard Ukrainian Studies, a journal devoid of objective research, financed and edited by Ukrainian nationalists.

* Proyect refers to “two secret decrees” of December 1932 by the Soviet Politburo that he has clearly not read. These stopped “Ukrainization” outside the Ukrainian SSR. Within the Ukrainian SSR “Ukrainization” continued unabated. It did not “come to an end” as Proyect claims.

* Proyect cites no evidence of a Soviet “policy of physically destroying the Ukrainian nation, especially its intelligentsia” because there was no such policy.

A Triumph of Socialism

The Soviet collectivization of agriculture is one of the greatest feats of social reform of the 20th century, if not the greatest of all, ranking with the “Green Revolution,” “miracle rice,” and the water-control undertakings in China and the USA. If Nobel Prizes were awarded for communist achievements, Soviet collectivization would be a top contender.

The historical truth about the Soviet Union is unpalatable not only to Nazi collaborators but to anticommunists of all stripes. Many who consider themselves to be on the Left, such as Social-Democrats and Trotskyists, repeat the lies of the overt fascists and the openly pro-capitalist writers. Objective scholars of Soviet history like Tauger, determined to tell the truth even when that truth is unpopular, are far too rare and often drowned out by the chorus of anticommunist falsifiers.

Sources: Mark Tauger’s research, especially “Modernization in Soviet Agriculture” (2006); “Stalin, Soviet Agriculture, and Collectivization” (2006); and “Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation.” (2005), all available on the Internet. More of Tauger’s articles are available at this page: https://www.newcoldwar.org/archive-of-writings-of-professor-mark-tauger-on-the-famine-scourges-of-the-early-years-of-the-soviet-union/

See also Chapter I of my book Blood Lies; The Evidence that Every Accusation against Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union in Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands Is False (New York: Red Star Press, 2013), at http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/furr_bloodliesch1.pdf

On the 1946-47 famine see Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “The Soviet Famine of 1946–1947, the Weather and Human Agency in Historical Perspective.” Europe-Asia Studies, 64:6, 987-1005.

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Distorção de História

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URL to article:

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Major-General Carlos Branco: “Liderança do partido bósnio defendia a instauração de um Estado islâmico”

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DN, 25 Novembro 2016

O major-general Carlos Branco fala da experiência na antiga Jugoslávia que serve de base ao livro “A Guerra nos Balcãs”

O major-general Carlos Branco exerceu funções na NATO e na ONU e esteve também no Afeganistão, mas é a sua experiência na antiga Jugoslávia que serve de base ao livro A Guerra nos Balcãs – Jihadismo, Geopolítica e Desinformação, lançado quinta-feira às 18.00 na Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar

No seu livro sobre as guerras nos Balcãs fala várias vezes de casais mistos, por exemplo um sérvio e uma croata. Foram estes os jugoslavos que mais sofreram?

É difícil dizer quem sofreu mais com a guerra. Certamente que os casais mistos sofreram, mas não necessariamente mais do que os outros. Sofreram de outra maneira. Sofreram a perda da sua identidade, da identidade jugoslava, tendo agora de fazer escolhas dilacerantes. É impossível estabelecer uma métrica para o sofrimento. O sofrimento não está diretamente relacionado com etnicidade ou com o género. Eventualmente uns terão sofrido mais do que outros. A explicação prende-se mais com as especificidades locais dos sítios onde se encontravam. A intensidade da guerra variou de local para local e ao longo do tempo.

Conta o caso da alemã que recusou ser vista como nazi e até acabou agredida. A memória das alianças locais na Segunda Guerra Mundial estava bem presente nas guerras balcânicas de 1991-1995?

A memória dessas alianças estava bem presente, sobretudo para os sérvios da Krajina. Era frequente encontrar pessoas, sobretudo as mais idosas, com familiares próximos mortos pelas forças croatas Ustaše durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. As feridas da Segunda Guerra Mundial tinham sido insuficientemente saradas. A subida de Tudjman ao poder e a narrativa fascizante e antissemita do novo regime croata vieram avivar essas memórias. As purgas e as perseguições feitas aos sérvios da Croácia, a não consagração na nova Constituição croata do estatuto de nação, passando a ser considerados cidadãos de segunda classe, a recuperação de símbolos do Estado fascista croata como a bandeira e a moeda fizeram o resto. Os intelectuais também deram o seu contributo. A disputa sobre o número de mortos no campo de concentração de Jasenovac e as tentativas revisionistas da história ajudaram ao desenlace fatal. Estava instalado o medo. Isso explica o levantamento sérvio na Croácia.

Considera que os sérvios foram diabolizados num conflito com vários culpados?

O major-general Carlos Branco foi observador da ONU na antiga Jugoslávia
Preferia utilizar a expressão responsabilidade em vez de culpa. Todos os grupos étnicos, ou antes, as elites, sobretudo as políticas, têm a sua quota-parte de responsabilidade no desenrolar dos acontecimentos. Naquele conflito, como em quase todos os conflitos desta natureza, não há santos de um lado e pecadores do outro. Em última análise, cada grupo via o oponente como uma ameaça à sua sobrevivência. A diabolização do oponente faz parte da guerra. Contudo, o que aconteceu nos Balcãs foi mais do que isso e envolveu a participação direta das grandes potências. A tarefa estava facilitada porque os interesses de certos grupos coincidiam com os interesses das grandes potências. Por isso, tanto os croatas como os muçulmanos da Bósnia tiveram empresas de relações públicas a trabalhar para si, pagas pelos seus mentores. O tratamento desigual dado aos diferentes grupos foi a consequência do discurso imposto pelos mais fortes na defesa dos seus patrocinados e, por conseguinte, dos próprios interesses. É nesta lógica que se deve entender a diabolização dos sérvios. A pouca clarividência das lideranças sérvias da Croácia e da Bósnia também ajudou.

Com a religião a definir nacionalidades era inevitável que os bósnios muçulmanos pedissem ajuda a extremistas estrangeiros?

Não necessariamente. Muçulmano não é sinónimo de extremismo. O problema é que a liderança do partido bósnio era extremista e defendia a instauração de um Estado islâmico teocrático. A esmagadora maioria dos elementos seculares foram expulsos do partido logo em 1992. É neste contexto e não noutro que se explica o recurso ao apoio da Al-Qaeda e dos países que defendiam o proselitismo religioso radical. É absolutamente indesculpável a complacência ou, se quisermos, a distração tida com o facto de a Bósnia se ter tornado durante a guerra uma frente da jihad global promovida pela Al-Qaeda.

Como classifica então a ação da comunidade internacional na ex-Jugoslávia?

É difícil falar da comunidade internacional como uma entidade homogénea. Poderia associar comunidade internacional com as Nações Unidas ou com o Conselho de Segurança. Fazê-lo seria, no entanto, redutor. Diferentes atores, nomeadamente as grandes potências, apoiaram os seus patrocinados. Os países islâmicos, por exemplo, apoiaram um dos grupos em presença. Na realidade, o que estava em jogo tinha implicações de natureza geopolítica traduzida no controlo dos Balcãs. Foi com base nesta premissa que se comportaram e atuaram os grandes atores da cena internacional.

As tropas portuguesas tiveram uma missão eficaz e pacificadora?

Enquanto estive na Jugoslávia não havia contingentes militares nacionais nas forças da ONU. Esse tipo de participação ocorre após a assinatura do acordo de Dayton e no âmbito da operação da NATO. As forças nacionais participaram num esforço coletivo que envolveu muitos países. Revelaram ser um poderoso instrumento de política externa do Estado português; dos mais importantes, talvez mesmo o mais importante, no pós-guerra fria. Os militares portugueses prestigiaram o país, e foram considerados e estimados pelos seus pares.

Qual a memória mais forte de um episódio vivido na ex-Jugoslávia?

É difícil isolar um episódio e dizer que foi o mais marcante. Pelo menos três serão difíceis de esquecer: as patrulhas que fiz na Krajina a seguir à operação militar do Exército croata, em agosto de 1995. O cenário dantesco de corpos de civis mortos nas bermas das estradas, das habitações ainda a arder e a evidência da partida apressada ficará gravada na memória para sempre; o acionamento de uma mina na zona de confrontação, na Krajina Sul; e o “desconforto” de estar na zona de morte de uma barragem de artilharia, na região de Bihac, felizmente sem consequências físicas.

Porquê escrever este livro?

São vários os motivos que me levaram a escrever este livro. Com base naquilo que vivenciei percebi que havia outras leituras possíveis dos acontecimentos, nalguns casos dissonantes daquelas consideradas oficialmente. Julguei importante partilhá-las e desse modo contribuir para a sua melhor compreensão. O conflito na Bósnia é talvez um dos conflitos dos tempos modernos mais mal explicados. Por exemplo, poucos analistas ocidentais consideraram a Bósnia uma frente da jihad global promovida pela Al-Qaeda. Este livro é, de certo modo, um ajuste de contas com a minha consciência e com a verdade.

L’Euro-fédéralisme, ou le lit de Procuste Par Bruno Guigue le 07 juillet 2016

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L’Euro-fédéralisme, ou le lit de Procuste *
Après la stupeur provoquée par la fronde populacière du 23 juin, les dirigeants de l’UE s’emploient à faire comme si de rien n’était, l’essentiel étant de perpétuer l’ordre des choses tout en tentant de limiter les dommages collatéraux. Faisant de nécessité vertu, ils appliquent alors un raisonnement qui est celui de la branche pourrie. Pour conjurer le risque de contagion qui menace l’édifice branlant échafaudé depuis trente ans, ils ne veulent voir dans l’amputation du membre félon qu’un inconvénient passager. L’important, c’est que les affaires reprennent et que rien ne change, à 27 comme à 28.
Tentation du statu quo
Pour la Commission, solder les comptes du Brexit permettra bientôt de le réduire au statut inoffensif de mauvais souvenir. Au prix d’une mutilation dont le préjudice est jugé surmontable, on entend bien perpétuer ad libitum l’espace mirifique du grand marché et en maintenir les règles, comme si rien de substantiel ne devait l’affecter. A ceux qui ne l’auraient pas compris, Jean-Claude Juncker a d’ailleurs adressé une formidable leçon de choses en annonçant, dès le lendemain du vote britannique, la poursuite des négociations sur l’instauration du libre-échange avec le Canada.
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Les dirigeants de l’UE, ont énoncé mercredi à Bruxelles leurs lignes rouges vis à vis de Londres. | EPA / MAXPPP
De leur côté, les partisans du fédéralisme se réjouissent secrètement de la défection d’un Etat qui constituait une pièce rapportée de la construction européenne. Et s’imaginant sans doute que l’UE y gagnera en cohésion, ils font la promotion d’un projet éminemment progressiste consistant à pousser les feux de l’intégration au moment même où un peuple d’Europe vient de la rejeter. Ce projet repose, il est vrai, sur un mythe tenace qui refait surface à chaque crise comme un serpent de mer, et qui se présente comme la solution rêvée aux déraillements récurrents de la machinerie communautaire. Ce mythe tenace, on le sait, c’est la transformation progressive de l’UE en un véritable Etat fédéral, au nom d’une communauté de destin supposée entre les peuples du Vieux Continent.
Haro sur l’Etat-nation
Perspective radieuse sur le papier, mais au prix d’une sérieuse prise de distance avec le monde réel. Ignorant toute profondeur historique, ses partisans font comme si la fabrication d’une entité supranationale pouvait damer le pion à des nations millénaires. Biffant d’un trait de plume technocratique l’histoire et la géographie, ils voient dans l’Etat-nation, au mieux, la butte-témoin d’un âge révolu. Ils y discernent avec dédain une sorte de survivance archaïque promise à l’étiolement, voire un simple catalogue d’us et coutumes révocable à loisir sur injonction bruxelloise.
C’est pourquoi ils espèrent l’avoir à l’usure. Avec le rouleau compresseur de l’intégration, ils veulent le faire disparaître, cet Etat-nation qui sent le moisi. Pour prémunir le capital de ses foucades démocratiques, ils lui substituent patiemment, depuis trente ans, un artefact dont l’obéissance aux marchés est garantie sur facture. L’Etat-nation est déjà privé de sa monnaie ; sa politique budgétaire est corsetée par des règles absurdes ; on lui interdit toute politique industrielle ; il est assujetti à des directives soustraites à la délibération populaire, mais ce n’est pas suffisant ! Par de nouveaux transferts de souveraineté que l’on justifiera en agitant l’épouvantail du populisme ou en brandissant l’étendard de la modernité, le fédéralisme n’aura de cesse de le mettre complètement à poil.
Le lit de Procuste
Prokrustes
Peu importe que la réalité historique des Etats-nations, attestée par la permanence des référents symboliques qui définissent le génie national, passe par pertes et profits du grand projet unificateur. Les langues nationales seront remplacées par l’anglais, et la culture originale dont témoignent ces idiomes ancestraux sera bientôt diluée dans les prétendues valeurs communes d’une Europe adonnée au Veau d’or. Comme le lit de Procuste, l’euro-fédéralisme coupe tout ce qui dépasse ! Il rêve d’annihiler les différences nationales pour les fondre dans un magma insipide dont le résultat prévisible sera, au mieux, la condamnation des Européens à l’impuissance collective.
Voulue par les concepteurs de l’Union, cette impuissance n’est pas un raté du système, elle en est l’essence même. En flouant la souveraineté nationale, en déniant à l’Etat le pouvoir de mener sa politique, le fédéralisme anéantit la volonté populaire. Car si un Etat ne peut plus décider de sa politique, on ne voit pourquoi il faudrait demander au peuple d’en délibérer. Les euro-fédéralistes le savent mais ils n’en ont cure : tuer l’Etat-nation, c’est tuer la démocratie. La nation, en effet, est le cadre ordinaire dans lequel un peuple peut s’imposer les lois de son choix, en changer si bon lui semble, et élire les dirigeants à qui il confie le soin de les appliquer.
Par une supercherie dont l’UE est la caricature, les fédéralistes entendent substituer à des Etats-nations historiques dans lesquels les peuples se reconnaissant une supra-nation dont personne n’a la moindre idée. Dans cette construction idéologique, le projet chimérique de l’Etat fédéral européen sert de paravent à une démolition en règle des corps collectifs dont l’Etat-nation est la clé de voûte. Au nom d’un super-Etat imaginaire, on entend saper l’existence de ces formes d’organisation collective qui ont fait l’Europe moderne, malgré les attaques qu’elles subissent désormais de la part des commis du capital.

Le modèle américain
Que l’Europe politique ait eu pour promoteur Jean Monnet, homme d’affaires travaillant pour les Etats-Unis, rappelle que la construction européenne est un projet made in USA. Car elle avait et elle a toujours pour finalité essentielle l’assujettissement de l’Europe occidentale, formidable réservoir d’hommes et de marchés, à l’hégémonie américaine. Mieux encore, les fédéralistes européens prennent les USA comme modèle, comme si les deux continents avaient des histoires comparables. Ce faisant, ils s’aveuglent sur les vertus de cette comparaison. Car ils oublient que c’est le vide des grands espaces américains, purgés de leurs indigènes récalcitrants, qui donna aux Etats-Unis leur cohésion, leur permettant d’absorber les vagues d’immigration successives en provenance du Vieux Continent.
s’il y a une nation américaine, c’est parce qu’elle est dès l’origine la projection de l’Europe vers son propre occident et qu’elle s’est déployée depuis un centre, le Nord-Est des Pères fondateurs, vers une périphérie qui fut une terre de conquête. Ce qui a fait l’unité américaine, c’est cette vacuité de l’espace. Terre sans histoire (autre que l’histoire à venir), l’Amérique a offert la virginité de ses plaines fertiles au labeur acharné de ses pionniers. Il est plus aisé, pour une communauté humaine, de forger son unité dans une géographie sans histoire que dans une géographie qui en est pleine, dans un espace vierge que dans un lieu déjà saturé de sens. Moyennant la destruction cynique des sociétés indiennes, la nation américaine a saisi cette chance.
L’alibi fédéraliste
Entre les USA et l’Europe, comparaison n’est donc pas raison. Le terreau de la construction européenne est encombré d’histoire, tandis que celui de la nation américaine était déblayé avant usage. La mémoire européenne est pleine, celle de l’Amérique cherche désespérément à se remplir. L’Amérique a fait de l’un avec du vide, et elle s’est contentée de le remplacer. L’Europe veut faire de l’un avec un multiple saturé qui lui colle à la peau. L’Amérique s’est bâtie sur une géographie sans histoire (européenne), l’Europe entend bâtir son avenir, mais en composant avec son passé. C’est pourquoi l’idée européenne a bien un sens, mais ce n’est pas celui que veut lui imposer au forceps l’idéologie fédéraliste.
L’euro-fédéralisme, en réalité, n’est pas un projet, mais un alibi. C’est une machine de guerre visant au désarmement unilatéral des souverainetés populaires, une tentative obstinée d’évidement, sous des prétextes humanistes, de ce qui constitue le substrat de la démocratie moderne. Vêtu des oripeaux du pacifisme, de l’humanisme et du progressisme, sa logique infernale accoucherait immanquablement de leurs contraires. En ramenant au plus petit dénominateur commun des volontés populaires privées de leur cadre naturel, l’euro-fédéralisme, s’il parvenait à ses fins, porterait le germe des affrontements qu’il prétend empêcher. Rien de bon pour les peuples européens ne sortira jamais du lit de Procuste.
Bruno Guigue | 7 juillet 2016
* Faire un lit de Procuste, désigne la tentative de mettre tous les hommes dans le même moule, standardiser les opinions et les comportements. C’est uniformiser, quitte à déformer ou dégrader. C’est reconnaitre ne pas être capable de s’adapter aux cas particuliers.
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Bruno Guigue, ancien élève de l’École Normale Supérieure et de l’ENA, Haut fonctionnaire d’Etat français, essayiste et politologue, professeur de philosophie dans l’enseignement secondaire, chargé de cours en relations internationales à l’Université de La Réunion. Il est l’auteur de cinq ouvrages, dont « Aux origines du conflit israélo-arabe, L’invisible remords de l’Occident, L’Harmattan, 2002 », et de centaines d’articles.
Source: http://arretsurinfo.ch/leuro-federalisme-ou-le-lit-de-procuste/

Soros – Crime Contra a Europa

arretsurinfo.ch:

“Ces ONG, financées par un milliardaire américain, qui encouragent les migrants à s’installer dans l’UE

Ces ONG financées par un milliardaire américain qui chuchotent à l’oreille de l’Union européenne pour encourager les migrants à s’y installer
Alors qu’une grande crise migratoire traverse l’Europe depuis de longs mois, certaines ONG jouissent d’une influence non négligeable auprès des instances décisionnelles de l’Union européenne. Derrière plusieurs d’entre elles se cache l’ombre de George Soros, le spéculateur et philanthrope américain.
Atlantico : D’après vous, les ONG qui préconisent l’installation des migrants en Europe reçoivent leurs directives et leur financement du spéculateur américain George Soros et de l’Union européenne. Pouvez-vous nous en dire plus ?
Bernard Carayon : Ce qu’il faut rappeler avant tout, c’est que l’Europe connaît un bouleversement humain, politique et social sans équivalent depuis 1945, avec l’arrivée de ce que l’on appelle les « migrants » dans notre novlangue collective : des étrangers en situation irrégulière et des réfugiés qu’on ne peut distinguer les uns des autres.
Une centaine d’ONG soutiennent l’installation de ces migrants en Europe. Un tiers d’entre elles sont subventionnées par l’Union européenne et par l’Open Society de George Soros. Le milliardaire spéculateur américain s’est fait connaître dans le passé pour avoir fait sauter la Banque d’Angleterre en 1992 et récupéré, au passage, plus d’un milliard de dollars, fait exploser les monnaies thaïlandaise et malaisienne en 1997, et spéculé contre le franc en 1993 ! Sa fortune est immense : près de 25 milliards de dollars ! Les revenus de ses capitaux ont été ou sont utilisés pour financer les « révolutions colorées » et des ONG, notamment pro-migrants : un milliard de dollars par an.
L’Open Society de George Soros et le think tank américain « Migration Policy Institute », domicilié à Washingthon D.C, ont par ailleurs publié en commun un rapport nommé « Accueillir l’engagement. Comment le sponsoring privé peut renforcer l’installation des réfugiés dans l’Union européenne ?« . Ce rapport se félicite que la Commission européenne ait encouragé l’appel aux sponsors privés et aux ONG pour réinstaller, hors-quotas, des migrants au sein des Etats-membres.
Autre élément : l’ONG PICUM, la « Plateforme pour la coopération internationale des sans-papiers », domiciliée à Bruxelles, exerce une influence considérable auprès des institutions européennes. Elle a produit récemment un guide à la suite de la directive de l’Union européenne « relative aux victimes », destiné à faire progresser l’accès à la protection, aux services, et à la justice des « migrants sans papiers ». Cette fois-encore, l’ONG est financée par l’Union européenne et par l’Open Society.
Troisième élément : l’ONG OXFAM, collaboratrice régulière de l’Open Society, finance avec cette dernière le mouvement « Y’en a marre » au Sénégal, qui est une tentative de « révolution colorée » dont Soros est coutumier ; Oxfam s’est investie aussi dans la lutte contre le charbon, à l’occasion de la COP 21, et est notamment financée par l’Union européenne, qui lui a versé 75,3 millions d’euros pour l’année 2013-2014.
Parmi tous les mauvais coups portés à la France – à l’industrie et aux banques françaises dans le passé –, OXFAM a exigé, dans son rapport « Solidarité avec le peuple syrien » d’octobre 2015, d’intensifier les programmes de réinstallation, critiquant la France parce qu’elle ne contribuait pas suffisamment à ces programmes, et a préconisé l’accélération des démarches pour les regroupements familiaux, l’accélération des modalités de parrainage communautaire ou des possibilités de bourse universitaire et de rémunération fondée sur le travail.
Un autre acteur du soutien aux immigrés est le réseau UNITED for Intercultural Action. Il est composé d’activistes d’extrême-gauche et notamment financé par le Conseil de l’Europe, la Commission européenne et l’Open Society.
On ajoutera également que, parmi les principaux think tanks influents sur la question, lethink tank américain European Stability Initiative est en réalité l’inspirateur du plan Merkel d’octobre 2015. Ce plan préconise que l’Allemagne accueille davantage de migrants et les exempte de visas pour circuler librement.
Derrière cet obscur think tank, on retrouve encore une fois l’Open Society de Soros, le Rockefeller Brothers Fund et bien d’autres financeurs américains.
Tout nous ramène ainsi au même homme : George Soros, celui qui finance à la fois l’opération des Panama Papers (au travers de l’ICIJ et de l’OCCRP) et ces ONG. Ces ONG pèsent à leur tour sur les institutions européennes et les programmes gouvernementaux, comme en Allemagne, pour accueillir des étrangers en situation irrégulière.
 
Au fond, vous critiquez aussi le fait que l’Union européenne, elle-même influencée par les ONG, finance justement les mêmes ONG qui soutiennent les migrants. C’est un échange à circuit fermé en quelque sorte ?
Il y a une complicité intellectuelle et politique entre l’Union européenne et les ONG que je viens de citer. Toutes sont portées par une idéologie sans-frontiériste, l’Europe représentant un terrain de choix car ses institutions sont très perméables à leurs idées politiques.
Cette question du financement n’a pas encore été posée devant l’opinion publique : qui finance ces ONG ? Comment peut-on accepter qu’une institution européenne soutienne des opérations qui violent les lois et les règlements des Etats membres de l’Union ? Financer des activités illégales, avec l’argent du contribuable européen, est illégitime et illégal !
Je souhaite que, pour le temps de la crise du Proche-Orient, les politiques migratoires ressortent de la compétence des Etats-nations, puisque l’Union européenne a démontré son impuissance et s’absorbe dans des solutions scandaleuses.
Je suggère que les députés français des Républicains au Parlement européen demandent des comptes à la Commission. Qu’ils réclament des chiffres ! Combien les contribuables européens payent-ils pour soutenir des ONG qui préconisent l’installation chez nous, en Europe, d’étrangers en situation irrégulière ?
L’administration bruxelloise apparaît totalement décalée par rapport aux aspirations des peuples. Partout en Europe, elle suscite un rejet qui rejaillit sur la construction communautaire. Un sondage, paru début mars, montrait que 59% des Français étaient hostiles à l’accueil des migrants. Et pourtant, en dépit de la poussée des mouvements de contestation dans l’opinion, l’Union continue dans cette direction.
Le ministre de l’Immigration australien a accusé les ONG d’encourager les migrants à des actes désespérés pour imposer un changement de politique migratoire, suite au suicide d’un migrant. Pensez-vous que les ONG et les think tanks aient un dessein politique supérieur au rôle humanitaire proclamé ?
Nul ne peut dire que les ONG agissent plus pour des raisons humanitaires que politiques.
J’observe simplement que la plupart d’entre elles sont financées par George Soros et que ses préoccupations sont vraiment politiques. On l’a vu à l’œuvre en Crimée, en Ukraine, en Géorgie, cherchant sans cesse l’affrontement avec les Russes et entraînant l’Europe dans ses obsessions, au mépris de nos intérêts et de notre amitié historique avec la Russie.
Son projet politique est partagé par une kyrielle de mouvements d’extrême-gauche, rejetant les frontières. Son projet, c’est No borders !
Soros, qui est derrière l’affaire des Panama Papers, ne donne pas pour autant un exemple éthique dans la gestion de sa fortune personnelle. Celle-ci a longtemps été gérée à travers le Quantum Fund, créé en 1973 et domicilié aux îles Caïman et aux Antilles néerlandaises. Ce fond n’a plus, depuis 2011, qu’une seule activité : gérer le Soros Fund Management, créé en 1969, et astucieusement installé à New York.
Le Soros Fund Management, qui a le mérite, en apparence, d’être domicilié aux Etats-Unis, a changé de statut en 2011 au lendemain de l’adoption par les USA de la loi Dodd Franck Wallstreet Reform And Consumer Protection qui a imposé un plus grand contrôle des marchés financiers et donc des fonds spéculatifs. Soros Fund a alors été transformé en « family office« , qui est exclu des obligations de transparence ! Le statut très particulier de ces « family offices » a fait l’objet d’un lobbying effréné, à l’époque, de George Soros, sous prétexte que l’argent familial devait être géré librement par la famille. En résumé, le Soros Fund Management est installé aux Etats-Unis, bénéficie d’un statut opaque, mais est géré par un fond, le Quantum Fund, domicilié dans des paradis fiscaux.
La Commission européenne propose une « contribution de solidarité » de 250 000 euros par réfugié pour contraindre les pays récalcitrants à l’accueil de réfugiés sur leur territoire : équivalent de leur suivi (éducation, logement, …) pendant 5 ans. Soit 50 000 euros par an. Pensez-vous qu’il y ait un décalage entre la cause des migrants et celle des Français dont le revenu de solidarité minimum est bien inférieur (socle du RSA : 6 288 euros par an) ?
C’est cela qui est scandaleux ! L’Union européenne se moque des travailleurs pauvres, issus des Etats de l’Union.
Je veux rappeler à nos bonnes consciences de gauche que le nombre de Français sans abris a progressé de 50% en 10 ans et de 84% à Paris, que le chômage des jeunes atteint en Europe 22%, près de 26% en France, alors que ces ONG exigent d’ouvrir le marché de l’emploi à ces migrants, négligeant les risques par ailleurs que représente leur infiltration par l’Etat islamique. D’ailleurs, puisque les ONG sont si promptes à agir avec tant d’énergie en faveur des migrants, je les invite à se mobiliser au service des SDF ou à rechercher l’accueil de leurs protégés auprès de l’Arabie Saoudite, du Qatar et de l’Algérie.
Sans compter que l’Union européenne a promis 6 milliards d’euros à la Turquie pour qu’Erdogan conserve chez lui les réfugiés de la région. Et il en profite pour obtenir la libre circulation des Turcs en Europe alors que son pays ne respecte pas les valeurs de l’Europe comme la liberté d’expression.
Propos recueillis par Clémence Houdiakova
Publié le 12 Mai 2016
Bernard Carayon est avocat et maître de conférences à l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris
Source: Atlantico
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